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OPINION OF THE COURT           
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
K.A. was a fifth-grade student at the Barrett 
Elementary Center of the Pocono Mountain School District 
(the ―School District‖), who was prohibited from distributing 
invitations to her classmates to a Christmas party at her 
church.  Her father filed suit on K.A.‘s behalf, alleging that 
the School District had violated her First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.  The District Court, applying the test 
announced in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), and finding no evidence 
that distribution of the invitations would threaten a 
―substantial disruption‖ of the school environment or interfere 
with the rights of others, id. at 514, granted K.A.‘s motion for 
preliminary injunctive relief.  For the following reasons, we 
will affirm the District Court. 
 
I. 
 
 In December 2010, K.A. attempted before the start of 
class to hand out invitations to her classmates to a Christmas 
party at her church.  The invitation was a flyer prepared by 
the church and stated the following: 
 
iKidzROCK Night 
Christmas Party 
 
Just for KIDS!  
(Grades K-6) 
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Friday, December 10
th
 
6:45-8:30pm 
 
Face Painting, Ping Pong, 
Foosball, Cup-Stacking,  
Games, Prizes, Puppets, Music, 
Snacks, and more! 
 
Admission and all activities are 
free! 
 
BRING A FRIEND! 
 
INNOVATION CHURCH 
ROUTE 940, 3 MILES EAST OF 
MT POCONO 
592-2000, EXT. 102 
 
(A. 100.)   
 
K.A. maintains that she wanted to hand out the 
invitations to share her religious faith with her classmates.  
While students at the Barrett Elementary Center are normally 
allowed to pass out invitations to birthday parties, Halloween 
parties, Valentine‘s dances, and the like during non-
instructional time, K.A.‘s teacher, Christina Sopko, informed 
K.A. that the principal, Heidi Donohue, would have to 
approve the flyer before she could distribute it.  After K.A. 
submitted the invitation for review, K.A.‘s father e-mailed 
Donohue to see if the flyer had been approved.  Donohue 
informed K.A.‘s father that non-school related flyers had to 
be approved by the superintendent, and the superintendent 
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had not approved K.A.‘s invitation.  When the father asked 
for a written explanation for the denial, Donohue referred to 
District Policy 913.  When he sought more clarification, the 
superintendent, Dr. Dwight Pfennig, informed him that Policy 
913 provided Pfennig with the authority to prohibit the 
distribution of such a flyer.   
 
At that time, Policy 913 stated, in pertinent part, that: 
 
Any requests from civic 
organizations or special interest 
groups which involve such 
activities as patriotic functions, 
contests, exhibits, sales of 
products to or by students, 
sending promotional materials 
home with students, graduation 
prizes 
or fund raising must be examined 
to insure that such activities 
promote student interests 
primarily, rather than the special 
interests of any particular group. . 
. .  
 
No individual, firm or corporation 
shall be permitted to engage in 
commercial advertising, 
promotion, solicitation or sales 
with regard to the student body, 
faculty, staff or the public on 
school district property or at any 
school sponsored activities unless 
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the same shall have been 
previously approved in writing by 
the District. 
 
(A. 116.)   
 
K.A.‘s father filed suit on her behalf in March 2011, 
alleging the School District had violated her First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights when it denied her permission 
to distribute the flyer.  K.A. filed a motion for a preliminary 
injunction in July 2011, requesting an order from the District 
Court barring the School District from prohibiting her 
distribution of religious flyers and materials.   
 
The School District revised Policy 913 twice since the 
suit was filed.  When the District Court first ruled on the 
motion for a preliminary injunction, the revised policy stated, 
in pertinent part, that:  
 
The Board prohibits the use of 
students and staff members for 
soliciting, advertising, or 
promoting nonschool events, 
organizations, groups, or 
individuals during the school day 
or at school-sponsored locations 
or events not otherwise open to 
nonschool organizations, groups, 
or individuals.   
 
During the school day, only 
literature and materials directly 
related to school district activities 
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or that contribute significantly to 
district instructional programs 
may be disseminated to or 
through students and staff 
members.  Prohibited materials 
may never be distributed or used 
at any time. 
 
A review of any nonschool 
written materials under [t]his 
policy will not discriminate on the 
basis of content or viewpoint, 
except that prohibited materials 
will be rejected, as will any 
materials that do not comply with 
Board policy, administrative 
procedures, or written 
announcements relating to the 
proposed nonschool[-]sponsored 
materials. 
 
Appropriate literature and 
materials relevant to nonschool 
organizations, groups or 
individuals may be disseminated 
by school[-]sponsored 
organizations involved in such 
activities as fundraising and 
community service, contingent 
upon approval by the 
Superintendent and/or designee. 
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K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:11-
CV-417, 2011 WL 5008358, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2011). 
 
After the District Court granted K.A.‘s motion for a 
preliminary injunction, the School District removed the word 
―Appropriate‖ from the final paragraph quoted above, and 
additionally added to the first paragraph the following 
language: ―An authorized representative of the nonschool 
organization or group must issue any and all requests to 
distribute and/or post nonschool materials.  The request must 
be made in writing to the building principal.‖  (Appellee‘s Br. 
Addendum 4-5.)   
 
Subsequent to the initiation of this lawsuit, the School 
District also revised Policy 220, which deals with ―Student 
Expression.‖1  (Appellee‘s Br. Addendum 1.)  Policy 220 
now states, in pertinent part, that: 
 
Only literature and materials 
directly related to school district 
activities or that contribute 
significantly to district 
instructional programs may be 
disseminated to or through 
students and staff members.  
However, invitations to individual 
                                              
1
 The School District claims Policy 220 was not 
considered in the denial of K.A.‘s flyer, because Pfennig and 
Donohue had considered the invitation ―as the solicitation 
materials of a nonschool organization, not student speech.‖  
(Appellant‘s Br. 7.)   
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student hosted social events (i.e. 
birthday parties, holiday parties, 
etc.) and/or holiday recognition 
cards may be distributed during 
designated non-instructional times 
during the school day upon 
approval of the Superintendent or 
designee. 
 
The Board shall require that 
students who wish to distribute 
such materials request 
administrative approval prior to 
distribution. 
 
(Appellee‘s Br. Addendum 2.)2    
 
 The District Court analyzed the School District‘s 
refusal to allow K.A. to distribute the flyers under the test 
established by Tinker.  Specifically, the District Court 
considered whether the School District‘s decision was 
justified by ―‗a specific and significant fear of disruption, not 
just some remote apprehension of disturbance.‘‖  K.A., 2011 
WL 5008358, at *3 (quoting Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. 
Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 211 (3d Cir. 2001)).   
                                              
2
 At the time K.A. sought to hand out the flyers, Policy 
220 stated that the School District could prohibit student 
expressions which ―[s]eek to establish the supremacy of a 
particular religious denomination, sect or point of view.‖  (A. 
114.)  This language has since been removed from Policy 
220. 
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The School District contended that its refusal to allow 
distribution of the flyer was supported by safety concerns and 
the possibility that parents might believe the party was a 
school-sanctioned event if it was sent home with students.  
The District Court rejected these concerns, noting that ―the 
Superintendent does not appear to have taken any steps to 
acquaint himself with the church or find out additional 
information‖ that would have led him to believe the 
Christmas party was unsafe in any way.  Id. at *4.  The 
District Court further observed that Pfennig testified that 
students at Barrett Elementary Center ―frequently bring home 
invitations to student birthday parties, as well as solicitations 
and other material from outside organizations,‖ putting 
parents ―on notice that much of the material that came home 
was for non-school sponsored events.‖  Id.  As such, the 
District Court held that the School District could not 
―articulate a specific and significant fear of disruption if K.A. 
was allowed to pass out her flyers.‖  Id.   
 
 Responding to the School District‘s contention that its 
restrictions on K.A.‘s flyer distribution should be evaluated 
under forum analysis, rather than under Tinker, the District 
Court concluded that, ―[e]ven assuming a nonpublic forum 
analysis was appropriate, the [S]chool [D]istrict‘s actions 
were likely too broad and arbitrary to stand up to 
constitutional challenge.‖  Id. at *5.  The District Court 
explained that it did not appear that the School District‘s 
restrictions were applied neutrally ―given the fact that 
materials for activities hosted by third-parties frequently went 
home with students.‖  Id.  The District Court also noted that 
―the Superintendent‘s elusive criteria for determining which 
materials could be distributed is simply too broad and vague 
to be considered reasonable,‖ as ―[t]he Superintendent‘s 
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‗unfamiliarity‘ with a given organization – without any 
procedure for establishing ‗familiarity‘ – is a criteria ripe for 
abuse.‖  Id.  The District Court further observed that the 
revised Policy 913 was also unconstitutional, since ―[a]n 
across the board ban on any type of ‗solicitation,‘ given the 
established vagaries of that term, clearly runs afoul of both 
Tinker and a nonpublic forum analysis.‖  Id. 
 
 The District Court denied the School District‘s motion 
for reconsideration.  The District Court held that the School 
District‘s reliance on Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 
(2007), was misplaced, because ―[t]he flyers distributed by 
K.A. contain quite a different message from the banner 
unfurled by the student in Morse,‖ as the former was 
―religious literature‖ while the latter was ―‗just nonsense 
meant to attract television cameras.‘‖  K.A., 2012 WL 
715304, at *2 (quoting Morse, 551 U.S. at 401).  The School 
District timely appealed. 
 
II. 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(a)(1). 
 
A. 
 
 ―We employ a tripartite standard of review for . . . 
preliminary injunctions.  We review the District Court‘s 
findings of fact for clear error.  Legal conclusions are 
assessed de novo.  The ultimate decision to grant or deny the 
injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.‖  Sypniewski v. 
Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 252 (3d Cir. 
12 
 
2002) (citing Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 
F.3d 160, 170 (3d Cir. 2001)).   
 
 The decision to issue a preliminary injunction is 
governed by a four-factor test: 
 
To obtain an injunction, the 
plaintiffs had to demonstrate (1) 
that they are reasonably likely to 
prevail eventually in the litigation 
and (2) that they are likely to 
suffer irreparable injury without 
relief.  If these two threshold 
showings are made the District 
Court then considers, to the extent 
relevant, (3) whether an 
injunction would harm the 
[defendants] more than denying 
relief would harm the plaintiffs 
and (4) whether granting relief 
would serve the public interest. 
 
Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 157 
(3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 
 
B. 
 
 The main issue in this appeal is the first prong of the 
preliminary injunction test: whether K.A. has demonstrated 
that she is reasonably likely to prevail in the litigation.  This 
requires that we first examine the legal standard applied by 
the District Court to K.A.‘s First Amendment claim.    
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1. 
 
 First Amendment claims are generally examined 
through the lens of forum analysis, under which ―the 
Government‘s interest in limiting the use of its property to its 
intended purpose‖ is weighed against ―the interest of those 
wishing to use the property for other purposes.‖  Cornelius v. 
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 
(1985); see also Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of 
Cal. Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 
2984 (2010) (―[I]n a progression of cases, this Court has 
employed forum analysis to determine when a government 
entity, in regulating property in its charge, may place 
limitations on speech.‖).  Under forum analysis, regulations 
of speech in public forums such as sidewalks and parks are 
―subject to the highest scrutiny‖ and ―survive only if they are 
narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state interest,‖ while 
identical regulations in nonpublic forums such as prisons and 
public schools ―must survive only a much more limited 
review,‖ and ―need only be reasonable, as long as the 
regulation is not an effort to suppress the speaker‘s activity 
due to disagreement with the speaker‘s view.‖  Int’l Soc’y for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79 
(1992).   
 
 In the student-speech context, however, the leading 
case is Tinker, where the Supreme Court affirmed that 
students ―do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.‖  393 U.S. at 
506.  The Court held that, while in school, a student ―may 
express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the 
conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without ‗materially and 
substantially interfer(ing) with the requirements of 
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appropriate discipline in the operation of the school‘ and 
without colliding with the rights of others.‖  393 U.S. at 513 
(quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 
1966)). 
 
Under Tinker many ―reasonable‖ speech regulations in 
our public schools that would survive constitutional scrutiny 
under nonpublic forum analysis would not pass muster 
because such restrictions infringe on a student‘s ability to 
express her opinions in a way that would not disrupt or 
interfere with the rights of others.  The critical distinction is 
the identity of the speaker.  Tinker and its progeny plainly 
apply to student expression.  See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue 
Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 927 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (―As this Court has emphasized, with then-Judge Alito 
writing for the majority, Tinker sets the general rule for 
regulating school speech . . . .‖ (citing Saxe, 240 F.3d at 
212)); see also Saxe, 240 F.3d at 211 (―Under Tinker, then, 
regulation of student speech is generally permissible only 
when the speech would substantially disrupt or interfere with 
the work of the school or the rights of other students.‖).  
Forum analysis, on the other hand, generally applies to the 
rights of outsiders who attempt to speak in our public schools.  
See Victory Through Jesus Sports Ministry Found. v. Lee’s 
Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 640 F.3d 329, 333-37 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(applying forum analysis to regulations that barred non-profit 
organization from participating in school district‘s ―Backpack 
Flyers for Students‖ program); Child Evangelism Fellowship 
of N.J. Inc. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 526-30 
(3d Cir. 2004) (applying forum analysis to school district 
regulations that barred religious organization from 
disseminating materials and staffing informational table at 
school events). 
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 To be sure, the Supreme Court has made clear in the 
context of student speech that ―the mode of analysis set forth 
in Tinker is not absolute.‖ Morse, 551 U.S. at 405.  
Specifically, the Court has held that a student‘s First 
Amendment rights may be circumscribed ―‗in light of the 
special characteristics of the school environment.‘‖ Id. 
(quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).  In this regard, the Court 
has recognized several ―narrow categories of speech that a 
school may restrict even without the threat of substantial 
disruption.‖  Saxe, 240 F.3d at 212.  In Bethel School Disrict 
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), the Court held that 
schools may restrict the manner in which a student conveys 
his message by forbidding and punishing the use of lewd, 
vulgar, indecent, and plainly offensive speech.  Id. at 680-86.  
Next, in Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 
(1988), the Court found that school officials may regulate 
speech that is school-sponsored or can reasonably be viewed 
as the school‘s own speech.  Id. at 273.  Most recently, in 
Morse, the Court held that ―schools may take steps to 
safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can 
reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use.‖  551 
U.S. at 397. 
 
 In none of these cases was the school first required to 
show that the speech would ―materially and substantially 
disrupt the work and discipline of the school,‖ Tinker, 393 
U.S. at 513, as Tinker had established.  See Saxe, 240 F.3d at 
212-13.  Instead, in each case, the Court identified certain 
vital interests that enable school officials to exercise control 
over student speech even in the absence of a substantial 
disruption.  See Morse, 551 U.S. at 408 (noting ―the special 
characteristics of the school environment, and the 
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governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse . . . 
allow schools to restrict student expression that they 
reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use‖ (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 
271 (―Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over 
[school-sponsored publications] to assure that participants 
learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that 
readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be 
inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of 
the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the 
school.‖); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (―The undoubted freedom 
to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and 
classrooms must be balanced against the society‘s 
countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of 
socially appropriate behavior.‖).  Nonetheless, in the absence 
of a showing of such vital interests, the Tinker material risk of 
substantial disruption test is the standard against which 
regulation of student expression on school grounds is to be 
judged.  
 
 This appeal presents the question of the extent to 
which Tinker applies in the elementary school context.  In 
particular, this appeal raises the issue of whether the age-
related developmental, disciplinary and educational concerns 
specific to elementary school students present the type of vital 
interests to school administration that render Tinker analysis 
inapplicable.  This appeal also presents the question of 
whether forum analysis trumps Tinker when the elementary 
school student is distributing materials prepared by an outside 
organization.  We answer each question in the negative. 
 
2. 
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   Neither the Supreme Court nor our Court has 
definitively addressed the question of the extent to which 
Tinker applies in the elementary school context.  Our prior 
precedents, however, have raised questions about application 
of the Tinker material risk of substantial disruption test to 
elementary school student speech. 
 
Our strongest statement in this regard appears in 
Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412 (3d 
Cir. 2003).  In that case, a teacher told a third-grade student 
that she could not circulate during instructional time or recess 
a petition objecting to a school trip to the circus.  Id. at 414.  
The student was, however, later permitted to pass out coloring 
books and stickers which dealt with cruelty to circus animals.  
Id.  Before affirming the district court‘s dismissal of the 
plaintiff‘s First Amendment claim, we explicitly questioned 
the applicability of Tinker to student speech in elementary 
schools: 
 
Instilling appropriate values is a primary goal for 
our public schools, one that is especially 
important in the earlier grades. Accordingly, 
young students demand a far greater level of 
guidance-guidance that is fundamental to our 
public schools‘ mission. 
 
That age is a crucial factor in this calculus 
does not necessar[il]y mean that third graders do 
not have First Amendment rights under Tinker. 
Tinker provides a flexible standard that arguably 
is able to incorporate these considerations. Tinker 
permits school regulation of student speech 
whenever the school can show that the speech 
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would be disruptive, or would interfere with the 
rights of other students. In essence, Tinker 
requires that schools have a legitimate 
educational or disciplinary justification for 
regulating student expression. That elementary 
schools require a greater degree of control, or a 
different kind of control, over students might be 
accommodated within the Tinker analysis. At the 
very least, anything that interferes with the 
legitimate educational and disciplinary functions 
of elementary schools could be regulated under 
Tinker. 
. . . . 
 
Nonetheless, at a certain point, a school 
child is so young that it might reasonably be 
presumed the First Amendment does not protect 
the kind of speech at issue here.  Where that 
point falls is subject to reasonable debate. 
 
Id. at 417.  Thus, while acknowledging the reality that the risk 
of disruption of educational and disciplinary functions may be 
different depending upon the age and maturity of the students, 
Walker-Serrano did not hold that Tinker analysis has no place 
in the elementary school setting. 
 
In Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg Harbor Township Board of 
Education, 342 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2003), we again 
acknowledged that ―[i]n the elementary school setting, age 
and context are key.‖  Id. at 275.  Furthermore, we noted that 
―the age of the students bears an important inverse 
relationship to the degree of control a school may exercise: as 
a general matter, the younger the students, the more control a 
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school may exercise.‖  Id. at 276.  And in S.G. ex rel A.G. v. 
Sayreville Board of Education, 333 F.3d 417, 423 (3d Cir. 
2003), we observed that ―a school‘s authority to control 
student speech in an elementary school setting is undoubtedly 
greater than in a high school setting.‖  See also Busch v. 
Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., 567 F.3d 89, 101 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(Barry, J., concurring) (lamenting the fact that ―while 
recognizing the crucial importance of age in determining the 
extent of the First Amendment‘s protections . . . [we] 
continue to scrutinize and analyze purported violations of the 
First Amendment rights of children at the pre-K and 
kindergarten levels‖).     
 
Yet, in none of these cases did we find that Tinker’s 
material risk of substantial disruption test must be abandoned 
in the elementary school context.  On the contrary, our prior 
precedents seem to recognize that the Tinker test has the 
requisite flexibility to accommodate the age-related 
developmental, educational, and disciplinary concerns of 
elementary school students. 
 
The School District relies upon the Seventh Circuit‘s 
decision in  Muller by Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse School, 
98 F.3d 1530 (7th Cir. 1996), to argue that Tinker does not 
apply in the elementary school context.  In that case, a fourth-
grader requested permission from his elementary school‘s 
principal to hand out invitations to a religious meeting to be 
held at the church his family attends.  The principal denied 
the request, and the fourth-grader‘s family sued.  
Significantly, the District Court found that the policies at 
issue in that case, as applied, abridged the student‘s First 
Amendment rights and enjoined the school officials from 
prohibiting the student‘s distribution of the invitations.  This 
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holding by the District Court was not challenged on appeal.  
See id. at 1535 (―Neither party contests the court‘s as-applied 
ruling.‖).  In the matter sub judice, the District Court similarly 
enjoined the School District ―from enforcing [Policy] 913 as 
applied to prohibit Plaintiff from distributing literature 
promoting religious events and activities . . . .‖  K.A., 2011 
WL 5008358, at *5 (emphasis added).  Thus, the ―as applied‖ 
ruling by the District Court in Muller is consistent with the 
result here.   
 
It was in the context of the facial challenge to the 
school‘s policies in Muller that the Seventh Circuit 
considered whether Tinker or forum analysis was appropriate 
in the elementary school context.  While one member of the 
Muller panel, Judge Manion, opined that ―it is unlikely that 
Tinker and its progeny apply to public elementary (or 
preschool) students‖ due to ―the important role age plays in 
student speech cases,‖ he was not joined by the other 
members of the panel in this assertion.
3
  Muller, 98 F.3d at 
                                              
3
 Judge Eschbach ―concur[red] in all respects with the 
court‘s opinion except for Part II,‖ where Judge Manion had 
considered the applicability of Tinker.  Muller, 98 F.3d at 
1545 (Eschbach, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  As Judge 
Eschbach explained, because the panel majority had chosen to 
decide the matter under forum analysis, ―[i]t is unnecessary . . 
. for this court to speculate that the free speech rights 
elaborated in the Tinker line of cases do not extend to 
elementary school children.‖  Id.  Judge Rovner, meanwhile, 
resisted the application of forum analysis, and ―disagree[d] 
with the suggestion that the standard articulated in Tinker is 
unlikely to apply to grammar school students.‖  Id. at 1546 
(Rovner, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).  
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1539.  Furthermore, Judge Manion retreated from this 
tentative conclusion in the very next sentence of his opinion, 
writing that ―because the Supreme Court has not directly 
decided this question, the following analysis will assume that 
grade schoolers partake in certain of the speech rights set out 
in the Tinker line of cases.‖  Id.  The Muller court ultimately 
held that the elementary school was a nonpublic forum, 
noting that ―[e]ven assuming Tinker expression rights apply 
to children in public elementary schools, an elementary 
school‘s nonpublic forum status remains, and we apply the 
most recent standard elaborated by the Supreme Court in 
Hazelwood, that of ‗reasonableness.‘‖  Id. at 1540. 
 
 We do not agree with the Muller court‘s application of 
forum analysis in this context, and as Judge Rovner explains 
in her concurrence, the court‘s reliance on Hazelwood and the 
standard set forth therein, was misplaced.  Id. at 1546 
(Rovner, J., concurring).  Hazelwood’s use of forum analysis 
is limited to cases where the student speech at issue bears the 
imprimatur of the school.  484 U.S. at 271-73; see also Saxe, 
240 F.3d at 213-14 (explaining that ―Hazelwood’s permissive 
‗legitimate pedagogical concern‘ test governs only when a 
student‘s school-sponsored speech could reasonably be 
viewed as speech of the school itself‖).  Because the student 
speech at issue in Muller was not school-sponsored speech, 
its reliance on Hazelwood and its use of forum analysis was 
misguided.
4
  Instead, Tinker’s ―more searching review,‖ 
Muller, 98 F.3d at 1546 (Rovner, J., concurring), provides the 
                                              
4
 We also note that Muller engaged in forum analysis 
because it adopted the standard set out in Hazelwood, not 
because of any distinction it drew between speech that 
originated with the student or from an outside source. 
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requisite analytic framework for even an elementary school 
student‘s speech or expression. 
 
The School District persists that if Tinker applies in the 
context presented here, Walker-Serrano supports use of  a 
―limited‖ Tinker analysis.  In Walker-Serrano, we stated:  
 
[I]f third graders enjoy rights under Tinker, 
those rights will necessaryily be very limited.  
Elementary school officials will undoubtedly be 
able to regulate much – perhaps most – of the 
speech that is protected in higher grades.  When 
officials have a legitimate educational reason – 
whether grounded on the need to preserve order, 
to facilitate learning or social development, or 
to protect the interests of other students – they 
may ordinarily regulate public elementary 
school children‘s speech. 
 
325 F.3d at 417-18.  This passage from Walker-Serrano is, 
however, dicta.  Moreover, we did not say in Walker-Serrano 
that the Tinker test of material risk of substantial disruption 
will not work effectively in the elementary school context.  
Indeed, Walker-Serrano – albeit also in dicta – recognized 
that ―Tinker provides a flexible standard that arguably is able 
to incorporate [age-related] considerations.‖  Walker-Serrano, 
325 F.3d at 417.  We thus understand Walker-Serrano to 
suggest that Tinker analysis can apply even in the elementary 
school context.
5
 
                                              
5
 Although in Walker-Serrano, we analyzed the 
applicability of Tinker to elementary school students, we 
decided the case on other grounds — that there was no 
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In Walker-Serrano, we noted that at that time, no other 
Court of Appeals had ruled on the applicability of Tinker in 
the elementary school context.  325 F.3d at 416.  However, 
since Walker-Serrano was decided, the Fifth Circuit, sitting 
en banc, has held that Tinker applies to elementary school 
student speech.  See Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 407-
09 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Elrod, J., writing for the 
majority on this point) (applying Tinker’s ―substantial 
disruption‖ standard to elementary school student speech to 
find viewpoint discrimination unconstitutional).  Writing 
separately, Judge Benavides explained, ―[a]s a preliminary 
matter, because it has been unclear, it should be clarified 
today that the student-speech rights announced in Tinker 
inhere in the elementary school context.  It is difficult to 
identify a constitutional justification for cabining the First 
Amendment protections announced in Tinker to older 
students.‖  Id. at 385-86.  We agree with this conclusion, and 
hold that the Tinker analysis has sufficient flexibility to 
accommodate the educational, developmental, and 
disciplinary interests at play in the elementary school 
environment. 
 
3. 
                                                                                                     
violation of the student‘s First Amendment rights because she 
was never punished, and because the school provided other 
outlets for her to express her opposition to the school field 
trip.  325 F.3d at 418-19 (―Regardless of the extent the Tinker 
analysis is properly employed in the elementary school 
context, the record here does not support a First Amendment 
violation claim.‖).  Therefore, the discussion on the 
applicability of the Tinker analysis to elementary school 
students in Walker-Serrano did not form part of our holding. 
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While the School District may have identified an 
interesting distinction in this case – that the invitation 
originated from the Innovation Church, not K.A. – it has 
failed to identify any persuasive authority that states that this 
distinction changes the analytical framework to forum 
analysis.  The speaker is still K.A., and not the Innovation 
Church.  Even in Muller, the fact that the invitation originated 
from an outside organization rather than the student himself 
did not dictate use of forum analysis.  98 F.3d at 1545 (―The 
Code . . . is a facially reasonable tool for ensuring that 
student-sponsored publications do not interfere with the 
school‘s critical educational mission.‖ (emphasis added)).  
And, as noted above, the school officials in Muller were 
enjoined from prohibiting distribution of the religious-themed 
invitations.  Id. (―Andrew‘s right not to have his expression 
suppressed solely because it is religious was vindicated in the 
district court and not appealed by defendants.‖). 
 
 Furthermore, we have applied Tinker even in cases 
where it appeared the speech originated from an outside 
source rather than the student.  In Walz, for example, we 
noted that: 
 
Daniel was in pre-kindergarten 
when he brought the ―Jesus 
[Loves] The Little Children‖ 
pencils to the holiday party.  
Furthermore, Dana Walz appears 
to have driven her son’s activity 
and this litigation.  Although we 
doubt whether the distribution of 
the pencils constituted Daniel’s 
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own expression, other courts have 
recognized that a student of 
similar age can understand and 
interpret basic principles of 
religious expression. 
 
342 F.3d at 275 (emphasis added) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 
472 U.S. 38, 42 (1985)); DeSpain v. DeKalb Cnty. Comm. 
Sch. Dist., 384 F.2d 836, 837 (7th Cir. 1967)).  Despite this 
observation, we conducted no forum analysis in Walz.  
Instead, we quoted Tinker and based our analysis on the 
premise that ―elementary school students retain certain First 
Amendment rights of expression.‖  Id. at 276, 280 (citing 
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 42).
6
   
 
 As we observed in J.S., ―Tinker sets the general rule 
for regulating school speech, and that rule is subject to several 
narrow exceptions.‖  J.S., 650 F.3d at 927 (citing Saxe, 240 
F.3d at 212).  The District Court correctly held that K.A.‘s 
speech does not fall into any of these exceptions.  It is not 
                                              
6
 However, we relied on Hazelwood in determining 
that the school was justified in restricting the student‘s 
distribution of the pencils because in seeking to hand them 
out, he ―controvert[ed] the rules of a structured classroom 
activity with the intention of promoting an unsolicited 
message.‖  Walz, 342 F.3d at 280.  We explained that ―where 
an elementary school‘s purpose in restricting student speech 
within an organized and structured educational activity is 
reasonably directed towards preserving its educational goals, 
we will ordinarily defer to the school‘s judgment.‖  Id. at 277-
78 (emphasis added). 
 
26 
 
―lewd, vulgar or profane‖ under Fraser.  Saxe, 240 F.3d at 
214.  It is not ―school-sponsored speech (that is, speech that a 
reasonable observer would view as the school‘s own speech)‖ 
under Hazelwood.  Id.
7
  And it is not ―promoting illegal drug 
use.‖  Morse, 551 U.S. at 402.  ―Speech falling outside of 
these categories . . . may be regulated only if it would 
                                              
7
 The School District‘s reliance on Perry Education 
Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983), 
misses this fundamental distinction between school-sponsored 
speech and an individual student‘s own speech.  The Supreme 
Court stated in Hazelwood that Perry, ―rather than our 
decision in Tinker . . . governs this case,‖ because a school 
newspaper is ―a supervised learning experience for journalism 
students‖ and an ―expressive activit[y] that students, parents, 
and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear 
the imprimatur of the school.‖  484 U.S. at 270-71.  As the 
Hazelwood Court explained, ―[t]he question whether the First 
Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student 
speech – the question that we addressed in Tinker – is 
different from the question whether the First Amendment 
requires a school affirmatively  to promote particular student 
speech.‖  Id.  Hazelwood drew a line between student speech 
and school-sponsored speech: while Tinker applied to the 
former, Perry and Hazelwood applied to the latter.  We 
recognized this distinction in Saxe: ―Hazelwood‘s permissive 
‗legitimate pedagogical concern‘ test governs only when a 
student‘s school-sponsored speech could reasonably be 
viewed as speech of the school itself . . . .‖  240 F.3d at 213-
14 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of 
Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)).  Because school-sponsored speech 
is not at issue here, Tinker governs, and the School District‘s 
reliance on Perry is misplaced. 
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substantially disrupt school operations or interfere with the 
right[s] of others.‖  Saxe, 240 F.3d at 214.    
 
Because K.A.‘s speech did not fall within any of the 
categories that obviate the material risk of substantial 
disruption test, the District Court correctly chose not to 
employ forum analysis.  The fact that K.A. was only in the 
fifth-grade and the invitation originated from her church does 
not mandate a different approach. 
 
C. 
 
We now evaluate whether K.A. has demonstrated that 
she is reasonably likely to prevail in this litigation under the 
Tinker standard.   
 
As we explained in Walker-Serrano: ―Tinker permits 
school regulation of student speech whenever the school can 
show that the speech would be disruptive, or would interfere 
with the rights of other students.‖  325 F.3d at 417.  At most, 
the School District justifies its regulation by arguing that the 
Innovation Church is ―a nonschool organization with which 
the School District has no familiarity.‖ (Reply Br. at 8-9.)  
The School District makes no argument whatsoever in this 
appeal that K.A.‘s speech was ―disruptive, or would interfere 
with the rights of other students.‖  Walker-Serrano, 325 F.3d 
at 417.  
 
Instead, the School District argues that it does not have 
to make such a showing because this Court stated in Walker-
Serrano that ―[a]bsent punishment for expression, a 
significant pattern of concrete suppression, or some other 
form of clear suppression of the expression of elementary 
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school students, a federal First Amendment action is not an 
appropriate forum for resolution of disputes over schools‘ 
control of third graders‘ conduct.‖  Id. at 419.  The School 
District claims that K.A. was never punished for her attempt 
to distribute the flyers, and that she was never discouraged 
from expressing her religious faith.  This standard from 
Walker-Serrano can be easily distinguished.  In that case: 
 
[N]ot only did Walker-Serrano 
collect over thirty signatures on 
her petition, she was never 
punished for this activity. 
Furthermore, the school 
authorities encouraged and 
permitted her to express her views 
in what they properly regarded as 
a pedagogically appropriate 
manner.  As in Fraser, ―[t]here is 
no suggestion that school officials 
attempted to regulate [Walker-
Serrano‘s] speech because they 
disagreed with the views [she] 
sought to express.  Nor does this 
case involve an attempt by school 
officials to ban written materials 
they consider ‗inappropriate‘ for 
[elementary] school students, or 
to limit what students should hear, 
read, or learn about.‖ Therefore, 
the record does not permit a 
finding that Walker-Serrano 
suffered an injury of 
constitutional dimension. 
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Id. (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, J., 
concurring)).  The facts here are markedly different: unlike 
Walker-Serrano, K.A. was not allowed to distribute her 
invitation – a ―clear suppression of‖ her expression.  Id.8 
 
 Accordingly, the School District‘s failure in this 
appeal to identify any disruption caused by K.A.‘s invitation, 
makes it reasonably likely that K.A. will prevail in this 
litigation.
9
  The District Court did not err in finding that the 
first prong of the preliminary injunction test was satisfied.  
  
We also hold that the original and revised versions of 
Policy 220 and 913 are unconstitutional as applied to the form 
of student expression at issue here.  Under either Policy 220 
or 913, ―[o]nly literature and materials directly related to 
school district activities or that contribute significantly to 
district instructional programs may be disseminated to or 
through students and staff members.‖  (Appellee‘s Br. 
Addendum 2, 4.)  These policies are broader than what is 
                                              
8
 Moreover, under Policies 913 and 220, K.A. is 
prohibited from distributing any invitation to a church-
sponsored event on school grounds, even to a single student. 
 
9
 No evidence was presented that the flyers were likely 
to cause K.A. to be held up to ridicule or bullying.  Nor was 
there evidence that distribution of the flyers would disrupt the 
school environment.  K.A. only sought to distribute the flyers 
during non-instructional time.  Finally, the School District did 
not present any evidence to suggest that there would be a 
misperception that the school was sponsoring a religious-
themed gathering of students. 
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allowed under Tinker and its progeny, which state that student 
expression can be regulated only if it causes disruption or 
interferes with the rights of others, or if it falls into one of the 
narrow exceptions to this rule (i.e., it is lewd, it promotes 
illegal drug use, or it is school-sponsored).  See J.S., 650 F.3d 
at 926-27. 
 
D. 
 
 K.A. also satisfies the other three prongs of the 
preliminary injunction test.  First, K.A. will suffer irreparable 
injury without an injunction, because as the Supreme Court 
held in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), ―[t]he loss of 
First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of 
time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.‖  Id. at 
373-74 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 
(1971) (per curiam)).   
 
Second, we fail to see how any harm results to the 
School District because of the preliminary injunction.  The 
School District claims it ―would be essentially required to 
maintain an open forum for the distribution of nonschool 
solicitation materials via an elementary school conduit,‖ and 
that ―nonschool organization[s] would use children for the 
distribution of materials to evade School District review and 
approval under Policy 913.‖  (Appellant‘s Br. at 39.)  We 
observe that the School District can still regulate the 
distribution of materials under the Tinker standard.  If a 
student distributed materials during instructional time, for 
example, or was otherwise disruptive or interfering with the 
rights of other students, the School District would remain free 
to regulate such speech.  In this particular instance, however, 
the School District failed to identify any disruption caused by 
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K.A.‘s invitation.  As such, the injunction does not harm the 
School District more than denying relief would harm K.A.   
 
Lastly, we hold that granting preliminary injunctive 
relief here is in the public interest because the enforcement of 
an unconstitutional law vindicates no public interest.  See 
ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 251 n.11 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(―[N]either the Government nor the public generally can 
claim an interest in the enforcement of an unconstitutional 
law.‖ (citation and international quotation marks omitted)).   
 
Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in granting a preliminary injunction. 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court‘s Order. 
